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Abstract: This paper highlights and discusses governance aspects and collaborative practices in relation to 
three cases of environmental integration in urban transport policy and planning. In each their way, the cases 
of Lund (Sweden), Groningen (the Netherlands) and Aalborg (Denmark) illustrate that environmental policy 
integration is very much an issue of managing policy processes and of conflict-handling; and hence of how to 
do rather than what to do. In particular, the cases offer illustrative examples of the importance of 
interdependence and trust between policymakers and influential actors in processes dealing with 
environmental policy integration. The cases support prescriptive conclusions that interdependence and trust 
should be viewed and dealt with as transformative processes. Trust and interdependence, and in particular the 
actors perception of interdependence, can itself be transformed, developed or established through interactive 
and more open policy and planning processes. Interdependence and trust can be learned, changed or adjusted 
through deliberative policy and planning processes. Hence, the cases indicate how environmental policy 
integration may be eased through an increased attention to the policy process itself; in particular through the 
facilitation and mediation of more interactive, collaborative and deliberative modes of conflict resolution and 
of collective learning. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
…if you make plans behind your desk, if you have a lot of experience in a certain area and you listen very well to 
everyone that has an interest in that area, and you listen very well to the politician that is in charge of that area – 
then with all your expertise, behind your desk, you may have a nice plan with a good balance of all interests. Then 
you have a plan that is technically the best plan there is. But, there is one thing missing, and that is support for the 
plan. All the things that you had in your mind when you made the plan, behind your desk, is not in the mind of the 
people that look at the plan when you present it. That can cause trouble. (Former leading civil servant in Groningen) 
 
Today, actors in urban and environmental policymaking and planning activities must face the 
hardship of dealing with change and development under conditions, which have often been 
described by analysts as increasingly complex, fragmented, and differentiated (see Hajer & 
Wagenaar, 2003; Dryzek, 2000; Forester, 1999; Castells, 1996; Bogason et al, 2004). It is often 
argued that traditional hierarchical public institutions are increasingly unable to cope with 
contemporary problems of rapid social, technological, and economic change through schematic top-
down regulatory approaches. In response to the apparent limited reach of the ´set solutions´ of 
formal government institutions, a new range of informal and often ad hoc policymaking practices is 
said to have emerged (Hajer & Wagenaar, 2003). Traditional mono-centric governing and 
regulation mechanisms give way to new and more interactive and collaborative ways of solving 
collective problems, for instance between the public and private sphere, resulting in the growth of 
more poly-centric ways of organising and pooling resources. This development has been 
characterised in terms of a move in focus from government to governance, and one of its main 
driving forces seem to be the realisation of interdependence and a need of coordination and 
collaboration across interests and actors.  
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So, if the `rules´ of policymaking and planning practices are changing, how can one talk of a 
capacity to act and to achieve specific goals under such circumstances? This paper aims to 
contribute to a discussion of deliberative governance approaches in relation to specific attempts at 
renewal of public policymaking. In doing so, a main focus on the role of interdependence and trust 
in collaborative practices will emerge, as they are identified to be some of the key elements in 
understanding and discussing the emergence of new and more interactive policymaking and 
planning practices. The discussion will be based in three cases of environmental integration in 
urban transport policymaking and planning – namely in the urban areas of Aalborg (DK), Lund (S) 
and Groningen (NL). Finally, the paper will draw some preliminary lessons learned from the cases 
in relation to the role of interdependence and trust among interests and actors in policymaking and 
planning practices. 
 
GOVERNANCE, INTERDEPENDENCE AND TRUST 
Proponents of governance approaches hold that many collective problems, such as those concerning 
urban development and environmental issues, are simply too complicated, too contested and too 
unstable to allow for schematic centralized regulation (Hajer & Wagenaar, 2003; Kooiman, 1993; 
Sehested, 2002). It seems increasingly difficult for planning authorities in a top-down oriented 
government context to single-handedly produce and implement new policies and plans, for instance 
for development and environmental improvement in urban areas. The accelerated spread of 
information and knowledge in society means that interests and actors outside traditional government 
settings are increasingly becoming skilled at arguing and putting pressure behind their case at still 
earlier phases in policymaking and planning processes. In addition, public planning authorities often 
also have to face a significant pressure to, or even reduction in, their resources. Those are only a 
couple of many circumstances that have combined into an increasing need for coordination and 
pooling of resources between a range of public as well as private actors and interests, if collective 
problems are to be solved. Concrete and pragmatic local problem-solving, joint responsibility, 
continuous performance-based and collective learning become potential building stones of 
alternative strategies and practices (Hajer & Wagenaar, 2003). 
 
In many ways, the governance perspective is about improving decision-making systems and 
increasing the capacity to get things done, not just as a result of the power and authority of formal 
institutions, but rather as a consequence of collaboration between varieties of actors (Stoker, 1998; 
Sehested, 2002). Governance can be characterised as a differentiated, polycentric political system 
based on autonomous subsystems and networks, in which public and private actors participate in 
decision-making processes on the background of interdependence and without clear hierarchical 
relations and limitations between actors and centres (Sehested, 2002, p. 47). Governance implies the 
active involvement in collective problem-solving of actors and resources outside the sphere of 
traditional government. It implies the advent of new types of institutions that are collaborative, 
involving different stakeholders, self-organising, and uniquely tailored to context, opportunities and 
problems (Hajer & Wagenaar, 2003). Such deliberative governance processes can also be 
characterised as a social inquiry in which participants seek to gain understanding of themselves and 
others, in order to learn and to persuade (Dryzek, 2000). Hence, it implies a focus on increased 
participation, collaboration and partnerships between interdependent sectors (horizontally), levels 
(vertically), and actors (interests), in order to achieve positive synergy-effects across and beyond 
the traditional borders of governments (Sehested, 2002). 
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Interdependence 
As indicated, interdependence is argued to play a key role in `driving´ these collaborative processes. 
For interdependence to appear, actors in policymaking and planning practices must recognise a 
limited ability to solve problems and act on their own. Mere interest-based bargaining must be 
substituted by an increased awareness of the necessity of pooling resources (e.g. economic and 
knowledge) between actors in new collaborative and more interactive policymaking practices. 
Several forms of interdependence may be discerned, see Bogason (2000, pp.26-27): A social 
dimension of interdependence is implied through the perceived need between actors for 
coordination despite differentiation in language, systems of meaning, and identities. Differentiation 
and fragmentation processes may lead to problems regarding collective solutions, but some actors 
may then, as a result, try to overcome those problems through collective action. Materially, there is 
interdependence from externalities and dependence related to common resources, e.g. in relation to 
ecological concerns. Closely related is spatial interdependence that can be understood in terms of 
geographical and/or ecological spread of externalities. Finally, Bogason also identifies time as a 
factor to interdependence, for instance when an organisational setup becomes fragmented and 
involved actors increasingly favour their own autonomy and follow their own rhythm only. Then 
strong discrepancies may occur, and actors realising their need for collective action will set in.  
 
Innes and Booher (2003) emphasises the importance of both diversity and interdependence in 
collaborative policy dialogues. Diversity is claimed to be central in order to take full advantage of 
the creativity that can come from trying to find actions that can respond to a wide set of competing 
interests (p. 40). Interdependence is found essential in order to achieve the kinds of results that will 
allow stakeholders collectively to create an adaptive learning system that can be robust and 
effective (p. 40). Innes and Booher point to a shared perception of interdependence around a 
specific problem as a driving force for voluntary collaborative processes. Such a perception has 
occurred, they exemplify, in cases where stakeholders depended strongly on the same limited 
resources (e.g. water or funding for transport) – which may be seen as material interdependence – or 
where linkages between stakeholders were simply too complicated and uncoordinated – hence 
similar to Bogason´s social interdependence. In addition, Innes and Booher claim that 
interdependence can be discovered and learned in collaborative practices. Stakeholders begin to 
learn about their interdependence as they explain their own situations and needs, but they learn most 
about this as the group goes through the difficult task of agreeing on how to define and measure the 
problem and deciding in their shared mission (p. 41). 
 
This paper intends to discuss, based on the cases, specific characteristics and circumstances related 
to interdependence, or the perception of interdependence. For instance, what is the role of problem 
pressure, e.g. in terms of material phenomena or (many) years of government failure or serious lack 
of coordination? Likewise, does a shared experience of interdependence also occur in cases of more 
proactive approaches, such as in examples of urban and transport policymaking and planning where 
the actual problems to be regulated and planned for are not yet so prevalent? And finally, (how) can 
interdependence be learned, and can it be facilitated (for instance by planners)? 
 
Trust 
Another central aspect in collaborative processes is the issue of trust, which is often closely related 
to interdependence. Trust between key (interdependent) players in policymaking and planning is 
often necessary in order to attain sufficient commitment, will, resources and accountability in 
finding and implementing solutions. According to Warren (1999), when one trusts, one accepts 
some amount of risk for potential harm in exchange for the benefits of cooperation (p. 1). However, 
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in political situations, and in processes of policymaking and planning, the assumption of solidarity 
with others is often suspect. Politics does not provide a natural environment for trust (p. 19), but 
trust can produce desirable means of social coordination when other means – such as state 
regulation and unintentional coordinations of markets – are limited in their capacities to accomplish 
necessary and desirable outcomes (Warren, 1999; Offe, 1999). One can distinguish between 
particularised and generalised trust. The kind of trust that contributes to social capital is trust that 
can be generalised to people who are strangers, as compared to trust that is particular, limited to 
one’s family or group (Warren, 1999; Uslaner, 1999). Generalised trust helps to build large-scale, 
complex, interdependent social networks and institutions and for this reason is a key disposition for 
developing social capital (Warren, 1999). 
 
Hajer and Wagenaar (2003) argue that trust cannot be assumed. Trust must be produced and 
reproduced in active interplay between actors. They argue that policymaking is not just about 
finding solutions, it is also about finding formats that generate trust among interdependent actors. In 
fact they claim that policymaking gets a new meaning as a constitutive force in creating trust among 
interdependent people (p.12), and that policymaking processes therefore often may lead to political 
will formation, rather than policymaking being the consequence of political will formation (p.13). It 
implies that practical political cultures and policymaking styles become central elements and 
objects of attention and possible change. Innes and Booher (2003, p. 37) support this by showing 
that in order to achieve collaboration and authentic dialogue (rather than rhetoric dialogue) a group 
of actors must define its own ground rules for interaction and its own mission. 
 
This paper will discuss whether and how relations of trust can contribute to limit the inefficiencies 
of rule-based means of coordination (as argued by Warren, 1999) and traditional mono-centric 
modes of governing, as well as to improve the workings of more interactive and collaborative 
approaches. 
 
THE CASES – AALBORG, LUND AND GRONINGEN  
The discussion in this paper will be built on evidence drawn from the author’s detailed study of 
specific efforts to transform, from an environmental perspective, urban transport policymaking and 
planning in Aalborg, Lund and Groningen through more than three decades. However, key attention 
will be given to developments in the 1990s and onwards, as this period provides useful data for 
discussing the issues put forward in this paper. The cases have been studied and analysed through 
preliminary questionnaires, documents (plans, reports, work papers, minutes, letters, debate and 
information material, and newspaper articles), 26 interviews, personal observations, dialogue as 
well as telephone and email communication, and finally feedback and reviewing of case histories 
from interview persons. The three cities have been known, since the 1970s, as forerunner 
communities in promoting environmentally friendly modes of transport. See [table 1] for an account 
of significant transport policy and planning initiatives in the three cities. Further insight into the 
study can be found in Hansen (2002). 
 
The Aalborg case concerns the development of an Action Plan for Traffic and Environment in 
Aalborg. A project organisation was established that consisted of a political Steering Group with 
leading politicians and a cross-sectored Project Group that mainly included leading civil servants 
and two consultants, see [figure 1]. The policymaking and planning process was rather closed with 
few examples of direct involvement of parties outside the formal political-administrative framework 
(only public transport companies). The attitudes of stakeholders and the public were tested through 
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a public pre-enquiry procedure, and public meetings (hearings) were arranged. Finally, a required 
public debate phase was carried out. 
 
Lund developed an ambitious and long-term vision and plan for environmentally adapted transport; 
called the LundaMaTs plan. The process leading to the final plan lasted more than 3 years, although 
the main activities went on for about 1½ year. It brought together a wide range of political parties, 
leading civil servants and interest parties in a new and specially tailored process, see [figure 1]. A 
political steering group, the Transport Commission, was established. It contained leading local 
politicians from the most influential political parties (across the traditional left-right spectrum) and 
was held directly responsible to the Municipal Council. In addition, a cross-sectored work group 
with leading civil servants and an independent consultant was organised. Furthermore, a Reference 
Group was established with business interests, grass-root organisations, the police, industry, 
schools, other public authorities, etc. An Expert Group consisting of leading academic staff from 
the University of Lund was associated with the policy and planning process. Finally, five public 
meetings were arranged. The whole process was supported and to some extent managed by the 
consultant company. 
 
In Groningen an extensive deliberation process was carried out in order to renew the local transport 
policy. The new policy was named De Bereikbare Stad Leefbaar; The Accessible and Liveable City. 
A cross-sectored Project Group that included leading civil servants and two independent consultants 
was established with direct responsibility to the Municipal Council and the Executive Management 
(of the municipal administration), see [figure 1]. The Project Group was given the task to establish 
and facilitate an extensive and open transport policymaking and planning process, involving key 
stakeholders and the public in general. An extensive participation experiment, lasting 1½ year, was 
carried out. A number of open groupings and practices were developed in order to provide 
stakeholders and citizens with the opportunity to participate directly in the political process. It 
happened in three steps; 1) Exploration of problems and solutions: questionnaires by telephone and 
newspaper (5,600 answers), two public round table discussions, and 18 work groups; 2) Elaboration 
of policy directions: Four workshops and public meetings along with a public debate through the 
local media; and 3) Decision-making: a draft on concepts and visions, debate phase (written 
reactions, two public debates, final questionnaire), policy and plan proposal, and finally a (formal) 
public enquiry procedure. 
 
INTERDEPENDENCE AND TRUST IN AALBORG, LUND AND GRONINGEN 
Seen in a perspective of more than three decades, the cases illustrate that a lack of trust and 
acknowledgement of interdependence may result in the use (or waste) of significant resources on 
struggles over policy control, as will be shown in the Aalborg and Groningen cases.  
 
Aalborg 
In Aalborg, a proactive environmentally oriented transport plan for the city centre was presented in 
1979. However, based in worries concerned with accessibility for cars, strong political forces 
among local business, the police, and the local newspaper worked strongly against the 
implementation of the plan, resulting in fragmentation and disintegration of the 1979 plan in the 
following years (see Flyvbjerg 1991 and 1998). Through the main part of the 1980s, that in its turn 
led to a much more cautious policy style among politicians and planners concerning local transport 
issues. Around 1990, new international and national impulses encircling the issue of sustainable 
development helped reopening local transport policy in Aalborg in a somewhat more visionary, 
proactive, and cooperative direction. Leading local civil servants succeeded in initiating a more 
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visionary view and discussion, among politicians and civil servants mostly, on transport issues from 
an environmental perspective. Moreover, in outspoken attempts to avoid break down situations 
similar to those of the aftermath of the 1979 plan, the local politicians sought, increasingly, to 
actively resist the influence of interest parties, in particular the local chamber of commerce. The 
politicians and civil servants regained control of the transport policy process. Thereby, a new 
process on action planning for traffic and environment was born, resulting in new plans in 1994 and 
1999, and today the process continues with activities of revising the former plans.  
 
However, from the late-1990s and onwards a growing concern, among local business in particular, 
for accessibility by cars and for road congestion in the city centre has, once again, put pressure to an 
environmentally oriented local transport policy and planning. It seems to indicate that there are 
unresolved issues to discuss in the relationship between, on the one hand, the local political-
administrative system, and on the other hand, local business interests. Success has not been 
achieved in maintaining, over a longer time span, a critical mass of the interests and support 
concerning long-term strategic goals. Local political life on these issues seems to remain rather 
unstable and continuously sensitive to debates arising around isolated events or around the 
implementation of each new project related to the above planning. 
 
The main reasons for that are likely to be found in a somewhat closed elitist political culture in 
Aalborg, where participation and collaboration processes on these issues have mostly been used in 
order to pragmatically test the political possibilities, rather than to more actively and openly 
involve, and establish (authentic) dialogue with, interests or the public in policymaking processes. 
Hence, the local transport policymaking process has been primarily mono-centric, hierarchical and 
dominated by politicians and civil servants from the Technical Administration, however with an 
occasional significant (sometimes decisive) influence of local business. Collaboration and more 
interactive approaches has been limited and based in a closed and elitist politician-civil servant 
framing, with few external participants (interests) in the policy process.1 An informal network 
between politicians, civil servants and key actors in the city has been identified. However, it has 
mainly been closed to outside influence and based in personal relations and personal trust rather 
than generalised trust. 
 
As Innes and Booher (2003) also found in a case on regional transportation, the actors in Aalborg 
do not seem to have been allowed to discover their interdependence. A significant-scale 
interdependent social network based in generalised trust has not been established. Similar to what 
Innes and Booher points out (based on several cases), the political-administrative culture in Aalborg 
still seem to be dominated by perceptions that categorise public participation as a separate activity 
for which the responsibilities of public agencies can be met with formal public hearings or advisory 
committees.  
 
Two [local] plans were made with a public pre-enquiry procedure. One plan was not because we became tired of it. 
People could not relate to it. They wanted to discuss concrete things, whereas we wanted to discuss how the traffic 
was going to be. So, we gave up. (Head of Transport Planning, until 2000) 
 
                                                 
1 Within this framing, however, civil servants of the Technical Administration have collaborated skilfully across 
political levels (e.g. with the Danish Ministry of Environment; thereby attracting co-funding) and also across sectors 
within the municipal organisation. Openness to the world outside the municipal organisation has often also occurred in 
the sense that local civil servants have actively sought information, knowledge and inspiration from outside sources. 
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The failure to more broadly recognise and explore interdependence may be seen a central obstacle 
to develop collaborative practices in Aalborg. Lack of sufficient recognition of interdependence, as 
well as of mutual learning and generalised trust, seem to keep Aalborg in its unstable, occasionally 
conflicting and to some extent counterproductive and implementation-inefficient situation. 
 
The lack of a shared perception of interdependence in Aalborg around a specific problem may, 
however, be partly explained by the lack of a genuine material problem pressure, e.g. extensive 
congestion and pollution. On the other hand, and referring to Bogason´s social dimension of 
interdependence, Aalborg’s history of conflicts over local transport issues provide strong incentives 
in itself for the development of a common perception of interdependence, based in recognising a 
need for coordination. Instead of finding formats that generate trust among interdependent actors 
(Hajer & Wagenaar, 2003), and as a counter reaction to the history of intractability, leading local 
politicians have given first priority to regaining a rather traditional government control over the 
transport political agenda in Aalborg, and hence to solve problems on their own, as indicated here: 
 
Traffic planning and planning for public transport in Aalborg has always been strongly influenced by the interests of 
the Chamber of Commerce in Aalborg. Bent Flyvbjerg wrote a doctoral thesis some years ago, in which he to a 
certain extent concluded that the politicians of Aalborg were in the hands of the Chamber of Commerce. I do not 
think that statement was completely wrong. …this [thesis] has frightened them [politicians and civil servants] out of 
their wits… The thesis is referred to every time there are some relevant issues concerning the inability of politicians, 
and also in relation to taking the bull by the horns and make a proper traffic planning. Several times, I have heard 
the thesis mentioned in debates in the Municipal Council… It is when we discuss, and we say that we should be 
careful not to let interest organisations control everything as our predecessors did... Interest organisations were 
allowed to govern the development, and that is not the intention. Because, it is also a question about who is 
governing, who should govern, and what are the consequences if no one wants to govern? (Alderman, Technical 
Administration, 1998-2002) 
 
The Chamber of Commerce has less power than earlier – they do not have veto-power today. But, of course they try 
to influence politics. As for the current debate about Nytorv, I have the impression that quite a few politicians have 
decided not to listen to the arguments of the Chamber of Commerce. The politicians may also have the opinion that 
the Chamber of Commerce does not know what they are talking about – and vice versa. (Journalist for local 
newspaper) 
 
However, conditions for collaborative practices may be changing these years, as indicated by the 
Head of the Municipal Architect’s Office: 
 
…it is even as though we are past discussions of competition – today one is talking about networking, strengthening 
through interactions, sensible division of labour, etc. 
 
Lund 
While the Aalborg case may primarily tell of aspects related to a lack of interdependence and 
generalised trust, Lund and Groningen provide a more convincing background for discussing how 
interdependence and trust may be recognised and developed.  
 
The development in Lund in the 1990s of a policy and planning aiming towards an environmentally 
adapted transport system was based in a process, in which a broad variety of stakeholders 
participated before and during the production of the first plan proposal. It was important to the 
success of those participatory and collaborative practices that the process was given adequate time 
to build consensus (i.e. transport political goals were debated for 1½ year). The long-stretched 
process provided the consultant in particular with the opportunity to distribute information and 
knowledge concerning transport and the environment to the politicians. 
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The way of working together meant that we kept this [Transport] Commission informed all the time of the 
proceedings of our work. We explained things to them and used scientific arguments everywhere possible. We 
always presented them with information on our working process. This way I believe we succeeded in keeping the 
process going. We took one step at a time, established a consensus, and then took another step, etc. So this way, 
when the LundaMaTs plan was finished, there was not really any debate in the Transport Commission. The 
Transport Commission had worked its way through this process. It meant that all the arguments, especially from the 
political parties, were well known already when LundaMaTs came into the hearing- and public debate-phase. Those 
arguments had already, to a large extent, been part of the discussions in the Transport Commission. (Consultant 
responsible for the planning process) 
 
The politicians, civil servants and stakeholders in the situation-specific organisation for transport 
policymaking, see figure 1, demonstrated abilities to work across sector limits as well as political 
levels. Furthermore, success was achieved in anchoring decisions, policies and plans broadly among 
key stakeholders from an early stage in the policy and planning process. As a result, the 
implementation of the plan has been eased significantly, and following debates and discussions on 
these issues have mostly been incorporated into the ongoing policy and planning process, rather 
than overturning, destabilising or fragmenting the process.  
 
This rather stable political as well as implementation-efficient situation can be understood as a 
consequence of several factors. It is consistently recognised that Lund has a strong tradition among 
local political and public administrative actors to conduct proactive approaches and knowledge 
based discussions (socially as well as technically) concerning environmental issues. These actors 
seem to have been open to debate new perspectives on the relationship between society and the 
environment, as well as engaged in pursuing their newly gained knowledge into politics, 
policymaking and planning. 
 
I believe the politicians in Lund are relatively open in listening to others people's views. I do not believe there is any 
specific power alliance, which you unfortunately can see in other municipalities. I believe there is a rather good 
listening-climate in Lund, when it comes to listen to the citizens of Lund - for instance through our questionnaires. 
(Journalist, local newspaper) 
 
The transport policymaking process was hierarchical in the way that politicians and civil servants 
had a firm grip on the political process and on initiating and managing the policy process. However, 
compared to in Aalborg, a much more poly-centric policy process was established in Lund. The 
Work Group and the Transport Commission controlled and managed the policy process, while 
collaborating with a variety of different participants and interests.  
 
Lund seems to have acted upon a broad awareness of interdependence, need for collaboration and 
significant sense of generalised trust. This interdependence should then be understood in social 
rather than material terms; based in the social construction of an environmental problem pressure. A 
genuine problem pressure, in material terms, do not seem to have been present in Lund (leading 
local civil servants consistently recognise this in interviews). The presence of generalised trust in 
Lund has contributed to provide the opportunity to build a large-scale, complex, interdependent 
social network (borrowing from Warren, 1999), and a process of (broadly) socially constructing 
local transport-environmental issues and concepts around which policy is built (borrowing from 
Innes and Booher, 2003). Here, general trust in local authorities has allowed politicians and civil 
servants to be at the centre of this network and process. It has allowed the political-administrative 
system the transmission of public opinion into administrative power (see also Dryzek, 2000). Lund 
seems to have a rather unique political culture which, through ongoing and open debating between 
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politicians, civil servants, stakeholders and the public, continuously produce and reproduce trust 
and perceptions of interdependence between actors. Diversity and competing interests, e.g. among 
stakeholders, are actively integrated in these processes, rather than excluded. 
 
I would rather see this process as interplay. I see no really strong actors with obvious key roles as I have seen it in 
other municipalities. I do not think it is like that in Lund. It seems like a so-called learning democracy with a lot of 
discussions, and many things come from these discussions. Thus, it is difficult to point out key actors. …It is very 
valuable just to gather different actors, such as the haulage contractor business, motor organisations, cyclist 
organisations, trade organisations, etc., around the same table so that they start talking to each other and understand 
each other… I believe it was very valuable for us, as the ones who should report this, to get to known all these 
arguments and views during our work. The incorporation of all these arguments and views into LundaMaTs means 
that the actors can recognise their own influence when they read it. It becomes much easier to go through with 
things and implement these issues when people feel they have been involved and have had influence. (Consultant 
responsible for the planning process) 
 
There is a risk that some things may be filtered away, for instance issues that are difficult and does not match the 
administration itself. Then it is better to have people from the outside looking at the problems. There is a risk that 
the administration in certain ways becomes preserving. Therefore it is important occasionally to take in impulses 
from the outside in order to get a more critical and structural analysis of different problems. I believe that 
organisations stagnate if they work too much within themselves. One must have impulses from the outside. (Head of 
the Highways Office) 
 
It is reasonable to conclude that Lund’s political life encircling these issues in general can be 
characterised as, borrowing the terms of Innes and Booher (2003), a stable, robust and effective 
adaptive learning system that embraces and includes difference, thus creating extra resources 
(concerning knowledge as well as economy) and creativity in building new policies and plans. 
 
Groningen 
Groningen seems to have experienced a collective learning process over the role of trust, and it also 
seems that a common recognition of interdependence in the policy process has been developed and 
established. In 1977, a severe political confrontation was awakened in response to the top-down and 
overnight implementation of an environmentally oriented transport project (The Traffic Circulation 
Plan). The result was a major change in the local transport system, with significant reductions in car 
traffic in the city centre. Local business interests opposed strongly; they opposed the actual physical 
changes made, but they also reacted strongly and with much indignation against the non-
compromising way in which those changes were implemented.  
 
This polarised situation was very much enlarged, or strengthened, by the way the traffic circulation [1977 project] 
was implemented. …they [local business] were so agitated, so angry by what had happened, by what had been done 
by the council and the Major and the Aldermen, so it was really hard to really work together. (Former leading civil 
servant) 
 
The indignation persisted through the 1980s, however softening successively as shop owners 
realised that reduced accessibility and mobility by car did not lead to general reductions in turn-
over. From late-1980s and onwards, a will to cooperate grew among the parties. It led to attempts to 
unify environmentally oriented goals in local transport policy with intentions to develop the city 
centre of Groningen economically. In the mid-1990s, however, a local referendum concerning a 
specific transport project, and a public debate associated with the referendum, indicated a declining 
lack in public support for the local transport policy. In response, leading local politicians and civil 
servants initiated the extensive deliberation process presented in the previous section.  
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In a rather unique way, compared to earlier local practices, the local transport policy and planning 
process was opened to an early and very extensive participation of organised interests as well as 
citizens in general. Elitist and hierarchical forms were pulled back to an extent that allowed a 
significant part of the policy process to be set free from the hands of politicians, civil servants and 
single powerful interests (such as local business). Thereby, self-organising elements was given the 
opportunity to evolve, e.g. in workgroups and workshops. Politicians and civil servants had to let go 
of some of the control of the contents of policy making and planning (especially in the early stages). 
They had to accept and develop roles as managers and facilitators of the process, together with the 
two consultants. Furthermore, the collaborative process left space and time for an open dialogue. 
The duration of the process was sometimes experienced by participants as being too long, but it was 
the slow process that made it clear and understandable to the participants that compromises had to 
be made across differences in opinions, interests and scenarios for solutions. 
 
It is like learning together. It is not the government convincing people, but convincing by finding out yourself. 
(Head of Urban Planning) 
 
Thereby, Groningen has successfully moved from a situation characterised by severe conflict to a 
situation characterised by collaboration, interaction, and common action. It has secured a high 
degree of public support in favour of the resulting policy, broad political anchoring among 
stakeholders, and it has for the same reasons significantly eased implementation.  
 
After the open planning process the traffic management policy has a very broad support from politicians and from 
the city as a whole… you see an enormous growth of support… In itself, the traffic policy did not change after the 
process, but the support changed. (Head of Urban Planning in Groningen) 
 
Earlier difficulties in the relationship between local politicians, especially left-wing politicians, and 
local business and trade have been replaced by intensified coordination and co-operation in the 
years since the mid-1990s. One example clearly indicates that collaborative and more interactive 
practices between these actors have been institutionalised, even in a formal setting. It is the so-
called Centre Management, a public-private partnership for city centre management. It consists of a 
frequently meeting board with politicians (Aldermen for Maintenance, Economics, and Urban 
development), senior civil servants, and Chairmen from local and regional business organisations. 
Furthermore, a number of sub-groupings are attached. One of the main aims of this partnership is to 
influence urban and transport policymaking and planning for Groningen city centre. 
 
The deliberation process in Groningen has been regarded a pioneering project in the Netherlands. It 
was seen as experimental and renewing because of its extensive bottom-up, dialogue-oriented and 
collaborative approach. The remarkable change from a somewhat unstable and occasionally openly 
hostile political situation to a much more stable political as well as implementation-efficient 
situation can be understood as a consequence of several factors. First of all, the intention of leading 
local politicians and civil servants was expressively to avoid a situation similar to the 
uncompromising attitudes, which dominated the 1970s and a good part of the 1980s. Another factor 
was the personal initiative and engagement of the then Alderman (1994-98) for Traffic, Transport 
and Economic Affairs – the Alderman did not have any significant disputes with local business and 
trade; on the contrary the Alderman improved relations with them. 
 
Furthermore, leading civil servants has also demonstrated an ability to discuss and develop policy 
documents across sectors and offices in the Municipal Administration. Two independent consultant 
companies also played a role. One consultant, IPP (Institute of Public and Politics), were in charge 
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of managing the policymaking process, but disagreement between IPP and the civil servants 
developed on how the process should be managed. The civil servants, and to some extent also the 
Alderman, were worried that IPP would ‘let things float’ too much and that the process would lack 
structure and management. Scepticism occurred among civil servants concerning the role of being 
‘only’ a facilitator. It reflected a worry that such a process would not produce a mature and 
consistent plan. However, it also indicated that the existing political and administrative culture was 
being challenged (and in fact changed, as exemplified above) – that it was hard for some civil 
servants to let go of some of their traditional tasks and responsibilities. Despite that civil servants 
were still responsible for the final plan, they could not control the process as they were used to, and 
to some the loss of control was a problem. 
 
Hence, the situation in the aftermath of the 1977 plan produced a significant decrease in both 
generalised and particularised trust among key players in Groningen. It was not just a decrease in 
the trust of local and regional business life in local authorities; it was also a matter of strong distrust 
at a personal level between leading businesses and leading politicians. Interdependence was not 
recognised, but rather overruled by the overnight implementation of the 1977 plan. The extensive 
policymaking process in the 1990s can be seen as a deliberative attempt at repairing and rebuilding 
these relations. The success in doing so has been consolidated, e.g. through the Centre Management 
and the Traffic Group. 
 
In general, working in a process like the Polder model [Dutch model of deliberation] it is very hard to make big 
steps because you need to take everyone with you. As we call it in The Netherlands; small margins, little space to 
move… the Polder model is very much based on very good personal relations and trust. That is very important. I 
think we are much further now in this city at the moment with those two things, trust and personal relations, than 10-
20 years ago. Absolutely. (Former leading civil servant in Groningen) 
 
The deliberation process provided time (as indicated to be important by Bogason, 2000) and room 
for discovering and building interdependence and trust. Borrowing again from Innes and Booher, 
new relationships and social capital were built among players who would not ordinarily even talk to 
each other, much less do so constructively. Such relationships were not about changing the interests 
of stakeholders; rather it was about changing how they expressed these interests and about allowing 
for a more respectful dialogue. It also provided greater incentive to seek mutually satisfactory 
solutions, and it helped people and parties to build trust among themselves. (Innes and Booher, 
2003, pp.43-44).  
 
Apart from the strong perception of a necessity to repair social aspects there was also a commonly 
perceived need for coordinating the handling of identified problems concerning accessibility, 
congestion and local (environmental) living conditions. Hence, a material problem pressure helped 
underpinning the building of interdependence in Groningen. 
 
I think that local government is more dependent on other actors than they were in the 60s. They have to make a 
relation with the retailers, to depend on each other. Like the inner city; they just have to work together. So, they 
need each other, and for that reason I think the local government is not any more able to say – well, this is the way 
we do it, whether you like it or not… people do not accept anymore that somebody says - well I know this better… 
That is becoming more and more difficult. I think people and different parties are more depending on each other, 
some would say they need each other. It is very important to look at them and find out: why do they need each other, 
what do they want to develop, what would they like as the end result. (Participant in the deliberation process) 
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SOME LESSONS FOR DELIBERATIVE GOVERNANCE 
The cases imply and support prescriptive conclusions that interdependence and issues of trust 
should be viewed and dealt with as processes. Interdependence and trust, and in particular versions 
of a more socially constructed perception of interdependence, can itself be (re-)established, 
transformed or developed through interactive and collaborative policy and planning processes. They 
can be learned, changed or adjusted, such as in Lund and Groningen. Interdependence and trust are 
essential in establishing, developing and stabilising systems and processes characterised by 
mutual/collective learning and collaboration – and hence also for the institutionalisation of those.  
 
The cases also imply and suggest a broader rationale of collaborating and of choosing or allowing 
for the effort of discovering and developing interdependence and trust. In a fragmenting and 
increasingly complex and diverse reality, actors find it increasingly difficult to act alone. Acting 
alone may produce significant results in the short term; such as when the Chamber of Commerce in 
Aalborg fragmented the 1979 plan; or when a few politicians in Groningen implemented the 1977 
project overnight. However, in the longer term such actions may backlash because they illustrate 
and warn others of a too biased and perhaps a too arrogant attempt at bending or bypassing the rules 
for a one-eyed purpose. The Aalborg and Groningen cases strongly suggest that the end does not 
always justify the means. Process and procedure matters. Actors remember; not just what was done, 
but in particular how it was done, as both cases illustrate. The use of harsh means by an actor 
negatively affects the ability of the same actor to successfully follow similar moves to achieve new 
ends. See also Innes and Booher (2003, p.55) for similar conclusions. 
 
Based on the lessons from the cases, this author tentatively suggests that formats for collaboration 
and deliberative governance, and in particular for generating trust among interdependent actors, 
should recognise and consider the following aspects: 
 
The extent of a genuine materially present and documented local problem pressure, or a more 
exclusively social constructed problem pressure (e.g. without any hands-on documentation for 
actual negative effects or consequences), are both important. In particular when they occur in 
unison they act as a strong incentive and driving force for common action. While the first version of 
problem pressure may indeed help construct the latter, it is however not to be considered a 
necessary precondition. The Lund case illustrates that problems may well be constructed and agreed 
upon without an extreme and overwhelming problem pressure. 
 
The more openness on situation-specific knowledge and different interests; the greater the 
opportunity for collaboration between actors to result in broad anchoring of goals, strategies and 
solutions. In addition, the earlier and the more direct the involvement in new policy practices of 
various relevant interest groups and citizens, the greater the possibility and constructive ability to 
deal with difference and diversity in opinion and interest – and thereby possibly to identify, 
eliminate or neutralise barriers and objections to a future plan implementation. Thereby, existing or 
potential conflicts may be managed before they gain a somewhat more significant negative 
influence through other channels. The Consultant, who was responsible for the policymaking and 
planning process in Lund, elaborates: 
 
We had worked with a number of projects when we started discussing the role and importance of consultations 
during the working process – not just after. It is important to bring in a number of different actors already during the 
work with the report. We proposed this process from the start… I believe it has worked… We added a Planning 
Council with a number of different actors and representatives for business & trade, the police, the health sector, etc. 
It was a very broad range of actors, with whom we had a large number of meetings and discussions – also as our 
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work proceeded with the LundaMaTs report. We constantly received views from these actors during our work. It 
was exceptionally valuable. We have suggested this set-up in other assignments afterwards. 
 
Difference and diversity need not to be equalised or eradicated in deliberative processes, rather it 
should become an integrative, productive and preferable also creative part of the social construction 
and anchoring of new agendas and new solutions. One need not necessarily agree on everything in 
deliberative processes. Given that there is time and opportunity for developing or adapting, in 
cooperation, to common narratives for a common future, there is often also room for different 
arguments and motives leading to the commonly agreed upon outcome. See also Dryzek (2000). 
 
Looking at the 1½ year of the LundaMaTs process, I do not believe it can be done much faster than that – because it 
is a process. If you want all these discussions between different actors and a consultation council, then it will not 
function if you do it significantly faster. If you seriously want to do it this way, it takes 1-1½ year. People need time 
to take all this material and all these thoughts into account. (Consultant responsible for the planning process in 
Lund) 
 
Close collaborative links between traditional government practices and new open and situation-
specific deliberative practices should be further developed. In doing so, traditional political-
administrative settings must discuss pragmatic, practical and problem-based opportunities for 
decentralising tasks to more flexible (e.g. cross-sectored, cross-levelled and/or public-private) and 
self-organising units and processes – while maintaining or adjusting procedures and (own) settings 
so that democratic legitimacy can still be accounted for. Shared responsibility should not imply 
decreasing responsibility of politicians and planners, e.g. to attend to risks that cannot be ignored, 
such as climate change. Rather, it should imply a change in the role of politicians and planners 
towards still more interaction, increased participation, facilitation and mediation as well as 
increased communication. The Lund case illustrates a combined solution, in which the 
establishment of the Transport Commission was an example of, on the one hand, a situation-specific 
policymaking setting based in deliberative practices, and on the other hand, the same setting had 
clear links to the established political system.  
 
It was such a great task, and with such great implications, that it had to be anchored broadly and at a high political 
level. Here, the Municipal Council was the appropriate level. Thus, the Transport Commission became directly 
responsible to the Municipal Council. The politicians wanted this strong coupling. The `heavy´ politicians were put 
in this Transport Commission, and all political parties were represented. That was surely the right thing to do if one 
considers the weight of the result and the debate that would come. It would not work to let one of the board's deal 
with this. There were many interests to be taken into account. Given that, the Municipal Council was the right place 
to weigh these interests. (Former Head of Transport Planning in Lund) 
 
Politicians and planners may benefit from improving their skills of coordinating and managing new 
and more interactive policy processes, rather than to focus too one-eyed on controlling the contents 
of political processes. In doing so, it is important, as Edelenbos (2005, pp. 130-131) also points out, 
that key politicians and planners are involved from the beginning of such new and more interactive 
processes, and that they play an active role in discussing and confirming the process design for the 
interactive process, such as in Lund and Groningen. If those actors are not engaged actively and 
constructively in forming the process, they may increasingly find such processes uninteresting and 
irrelevant, and ultimately deem them insignificant in relation to their own political agenda. Ongoing 
feedback mechanisms between key actors should also be established and prioritised. 
 
Finally, in designing, coordinating and managing more interactive policymaking processes, 
politicians and planners should be careful to provide information and knowledge as well as to create 
a genuine room and opportunity for learning and change. In some cases, as the Groningen case is 
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also an example of, it implies that actors in deliberative participatory practices should be given time 
and possibility to learn and see what planners may already know, as discussed here by a former 
leading civil servant in Groningen: 
 
…when you are doing something like this you have to incorporate the citizens so that they can give their opinion. 
When you are doing something with participatory processes it gives people the possibility to express their opinion. 
Then you need to be sure that something can be changed. It is maybe a kind of trick, but it is important not to give 
the best for those participatory processes. Start with a plan in which things can be changed… because otherwise they 
will not accept it. All those plans… always have a compromise, you have to make a balance between the interests of 
all the parties involved. And if you are doing too good a job starting that process [as a planner], then there is nothing 
to re-balance latter on… That is the way to cover the situation. So that in the end all parties involved are satisfied 
with the results, because they realise that there has been compromised, and they realised that there is a good balance, 
and realise that there are other interests who also need to be covered in that plan. …you can manage a lot by giving 
the right information at the right moment, because in those working groups there is also a process going on, people 
are thinking about things, making decisions, and going a certain way in thinking. It is very important to give 
information at the right moment, to make them decide to go this or that way… The other way is that I think that 
those processes should not give a very detailed plan, a very detailed picture of what should happen, but more general 
ideas that can be worked out latter on by people who have the right information and expertise... Then you have the 
support of lots of people for the plans. 
 
In conclusion, deliberative governance can illuminate conflicting relations and provoke or massage 
those early in policy and planning processes; conflicts that would have emerged and backfired on 
the process anyway. The early discovery in such processes of problems, imbalances and differences 
in interests and opinions may improve the chance to establish and implement workable 
compromises on goals and solutions.  
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Table 1. Significant transport policy and planning initiatives from an environmental perspective in Lund, 
Groningen, and Aalborg. (Titles translated, comments added in Italics). 
Lund Groningen Aalborg 
1969: Municipal Council 
decision: Abandoning of 
plans for 4-lane road 
through city centre 
1972: Traffic and 
Environment, plan: 
Restrictions for private 
cars in city centre, 
introduction of parking 
fees 
1985: Traffic in the Inner 
City of Lund, plan: 
Pedestrian areas, public 
transport initiatives, new 
bus station at the railway 
station, bicycling facilities
1999: LundaMaTs, plan: 
Ambition to establish an 
environmentally adapted 
transport system in Lund 
1972: Municipal Council decision: Lower 
acceptance levels of noise and air pollution 
and improved conditions for pedestrians in 
city centre 
1977: Traffic Circulation Plan: Zoning of 
inner city – no crossing in private car of 
zone boundaries. Inner road ring. 
Expansion of pedestrian areas 
1987: Master Plan: Integration of offices, 
public transport and bicycle facilities 
around the railway station 
1993: Hand on Heart, a New City Centre 
for Groningen, plan: The ”compact city” 
concept. Park-and-Ride facilities 
1996: City for a New Century, Groningen 
in 2005, Master Plan: Mix of public 
transport measures, new parking facilities, 
improvement of existing ring roads 
1997: The Accessible and Liveable City 
policy and plan: Ambition to improve local 
economic development while improving 
housing and living conditions 
1975: Municipal Council decision: 
Abandoning of plans for extension of 
a road through city centre  
1979: Plan proposal for area use and 
transport in city centre: Public 
transport improvements, restrictions 
for private cars 
1994: Action Plan for Traffic and 
Environment: Public transport 
improvements, bicycle facilities, 
traffic calming of city centre 
1996: Traffic and Environment Plan 
for Aalborg City Centre: parking 
policies, public transport, visual 
improvements of pedestrian areas, 
restrictions for private cars  
1999: 2nd Action Plan for Traffic and 
Environment: Ambition to ensure a 
sustainable development by 
weighing the need for good 
transport options and limitation of 
environmental disturbances 
 
 
Figure 1. The project organisations leading to transport policies and plans from an environmental 
perspective in Lund (1999), Groningen (1997), and Aalborg (1999). 
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